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Abstract
This study analyzes how three groups of market participants - insiders, an-
alysts, and investors - revised their expected returns on New York Real Es-
tate Investment Trusts (REITs) in response to the catastrophic events of
September 11, 2001. The attack on the WTC represents a unique experi-
mental setting to evaluate financial markets’ reaction to external shocks for
several reasons. First, unlike prior studies of market reactions, these events,
of a totally unanticipated and unprecedented nature, could not have been
built into the market’s expectations and prices; hence, market participants
had to learn something new rather than just revise their beliefs from past
occurrences. Second, again unlike other studies, the impact of the terrorist
attacks on REIT returns was ambiguous, since it was uncertain if the eﬀect
of reduced supply of oﬃce space in New York would outweigh the impact
of the negative shocks to the local and national economy on its demand.
Finally, the period of market closure that followed 9/11 gave these players
ample opportunity to reassess their expectations. Our analysis reveals that,
on the day when markets reopened, REITs with significant exposure to the
New York area outperformed a broad REIT oﬃce index by 4.1%. However,
we find that, according to several metrics of real market behavior, this antici-
pated superior performance of New York oﬃce properties did not materialize.
Consistent with notions of market eﬃciency, we find that insiders were the
first to lower their expectations (99.9% of their trades in REITs with New
York exposure were sales in the month following 9/11), followed by analysts
(the vast majority of them revised downward their expectations of NY REIT
performance in the first weeks of November 2001), and finally market prices
adjusted to reflect the underlying real market behavior; indeed, abnormal
REIT returns had disappeared by mid November 2001.
JEL classification: G14; R33
Keywords: Abnormal Returns; Market Over-Reaction; Nonresidential
Real Estate; REITs
1 Introduction
A critical aspect of asset pricing is the degree to which current prices accu-
rately reflect informed investors’ expectations of future cash flows. This topic
has been the subject of a voluminous and diverse literature. Cowles (1933)
began this debate by raising the issue of how well market participants react
to information, initiating the vast literature addressing market eﬃciency.1
Another important starting point in the analysis of stock market reactions
to news is in the early behavioral economics research. An example is Kah-
neman and Tversky (1973), who suggested that individuals have a tendency
to overweigh recent news.2 Numerous studies have documented market over-
reaction.3 Other studies find under-reaction.4 In addition, researchers have
documented that markets appear to be “too volatile,” in the sense that prices
move much more than the levels justified by changes in “fundamentals.”5
Our study builds on this research by empirically examining how three
separate classes of market participants - insiders, analysts, and investors -
revised their expectations of returns on New York Real Estate Investment
Trusts (REITs) in response to the catastrophic events of September 11, 2001.
To allow our empirical analysis to be focused and tractable, we study the
market presumably most aﬀected: The metropolitan New York oﬃce real
estate market. The attacks of 9/11 were unprecedented. Besides the horrific
loss of human life, the devastation was immense. As of December 21, 2001, it
was estimated that 13.4 million square feet of oﬃce space was destroyed, 12.1
million was damaged and remained closed, and only 5.6 million was damaged
but could be re-opened.6
1See also Fama et al. (1969), Jegadeesh (1990), and Jegadeesh and Titman (1995),
as well as Fama (1991, 1998) and Schwert (2003) for relatively recent surveys of market
eﬃciency.
2In particular, a number of studies have examined how bad news concerning a bank’s
clients can aﬀect the price of bank stocks; see, for example, Smirlock and Kaufold (1987)
or Sinkey and Carter (1999).
3DeBondt and Thaler (1985, 1987) address the link between mean reversion and in-
vestor over-reaction, showing that portfolios formed from poor performers had significantly
higher abnormal returns than portfolios formed from good performers. The latter paper
focuses on the impact of time varying risk premia. DeBondt and Thaler (1990) provides
evidence of overreaction in analysts’ forecasts. This paper builds on the earlier analysis of
Elton et al. (1984), who show that analysts over (under) estimate the growth in earnings
of firms they believe would be good (bad) performers. More recently, Chan (2003) shows
that bad news leads to significantly longer drift in prices than good news. See also Barrett
et al. (1987), Lamb (1995), Veronesi (1999), and Carter and Simkins (2002).
4Cohen et al. (2002) is a recent example.
5See Shiller (1981, 1989) for an introduction to this topic.
6See Grubb and Ellis (2001).
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This event provides a unique setting to evaluate the speed and accu-
racy of belief revisions of insiders, analysts, and investors following external
shocks. Indeed, unlike almost all studies of important economic events, this
tragedy was certainly unanticipated and thus could not have been built into
pre-existing market expectations and prices. Furthermore, the longest-ever
period of market closure that followed the attack (from Tuesday, Septem-
ber 11 to the following Monday, September 17) gave investors ample time
to digest the relevant information and to incorporate it into the prices that
emerged when markets re-opened.7 Hence, our experiment is free from short-
term ”behavioral” eﬀects. Another unique aspect of our study is that, unlike
other analyses of reactions to news, the short- and long-term impact of 9/11
on the New York oﬃce market was ambiguous. From the supply side, one
could reasonably have assumed that the destruction of a vast amount of
prime oﬃce space would drive up the value of the remaining New York oﬃce
properties.8 We call this argument the supply reduction eﬀect. Conversely,
one could have presumed that the resulting shocks to an already teetering
economy would have plunged the city of New York and the nation into a deep
recession, negatively aﬀecting the price of real estate (and other) assets. We
call this argument the recessionary shock eﬀect.9 Finally, our data set, by
allowing us to compare the real and financial market performance of oﬃce
Real Estate Investment Trusts (REITs) with some New York exposure to
those without any New York presence, also enables us to separate the local
eﬀects from the shocks that aﬀected the entire U.S. oﬃce real estate market.
The main hypothesis we test in this study is whether or not the speed
with which those three categories of market participants (insiders, analysts,
and investors) adjusted to the true underlying behavior of the real markets is
consistent with our usual notions of market eﬃciency. Each of these groups
had a diﬀerent information set and, presumably, based on the events on and
following September 11, adjusted their beliefs about returns in diﬀerent ways.
Specifically, did insiders react faster than analysts, who in turn acted more
quickly than the general class of investors? Our measurement of this speed of
revision is necessarily indirect. We evaluate insiders’ beliefs by their relative
levels of selling and buying of REITs. We evaluate analysts’ beliefs by their
recommendations on REITs. Lastly, we evaluate the aggregate market’s
7French and Roll (1986) provide an analysis of volatility during periods of market
closure.
8The New York oﬃce area is the largest oﬃce market in the U.S., representing approx-
imately 9% of its total urban oﬃce space. At the time of the September 11 attacks, the
oﬃce vacancy rate in New York was only 3%.
9We document these conflicting stances in Section 4 by examining analysts’ reports in
the months following September 11.
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beliefs by measuring the stock price performance relative to a REIT index
benchmark.
To this purpose, we analyze all public REITs that specialize in oﬃce
properties, with the sole exception of the two oﬃce REITs that owned prop-
erties directly hit by the terrorist attack to downtown Manhattan.10 This
allows us to assess the performance of the underlying oﬃce properties (i.e.,
the physical rather than the securitized assets) by the end of the last quarter
of 2001. This horizon strikes a balance between being long enough for us
to assess the economic impact of the event on the real markets, and being
short enough so that unrelated factors do not contaminate our performance
measurements.11 The resulting sample of 27 oﬃce REITs allows us to study
market participants’ expectations about the impact of September 11 on the
remaining supply of New York oﬃce space, both in an absolute sense and in
relation to other U.S. oﬃce properties. REITs provide an ideal structure for
our empirical tests for a number of reasons: (i) because of the availability of
data on REIT holdings, we can accurately estimate each REIT’s exposure
to the New York oﬃce market; (ii) detailed data on the performance of the
underlying real asset markets are available; (iii) the performance of the oﬃce
REITs with New York exposure can be benchmarked against oﬃce REITs
without New York exposure to control for macro real estate market eﬀects.
To briefly survey our results, we find evidence that each of our three
groups of market participants behaved in a manner consistent with market
eﬃciency. This finding is remarkable in light of the fact that, unlike most
studies of market reactions, the event we examine was not only unprece-
dented in scale and scope but also completely unanticipated. Specifically,
we show that the equity market initially anticipated that REITs with an
exposure to the New York market would achieve significant gains relative to
their benchmark, consistent with the supply reduction eﬀect. REITs with
exposure to the New York market experienced an average excess return of
4.1% from the close on September 10 to the close on September 17 relative
to a broad REIT index. In contrast, the subsequent performance in the real
asset market for oﬃce properties appeared to have reflected the recessionary
shock hypothesis. According to several measures of real asset performance,
New York properties experienced either a significantly negative or no abnor-
mal performance with respect to similar oﬃce properties in the U.S. over the
three-month horizon following the terrorist attack. Yet, we also find that
10These REITs are Brookfield Properties and TriZecHahn Corporation.
11Indeed, the impact on properties in the damaged areas involved highly complex insur-
ance claims that were far from being resolved in the first three months after 9/11. The
impact of September 11 on insurers is analyzed in depth by Doherty et al. (2003), who
test the validity of several theoretical insurance models of external shocks.
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the divergence between the equity market’s assessment of the impact of the
events of 9/11 on New York REITs and the corresponding resolution in the
real markets quickly disappeared: The cumulative abnormal returns on New
York REITs drifted to zero by early November.
New York REIT insiders were the first to accurately identify these devel-
opments. For the first eight months of 2001, insider trading patterns were
almost identical for REITs with and without New York exposure. However,
in the trimester after September 11, insider sales significantly exceeded in-
sider purchases for REITs with New York exposure, while the reverse was
true for non-New York REITs. For instance, in the month following the re-
opening of U.S. financial markets, insider trading in REITs with New York
exposure was 26 times insider trading in REITs of comparable total market
capitalizations but without New York exposure; in addition, sales represented
99.9% of the total volume of insider trades in New York REITs, but just 68%
of the total volume of insider trades in REITs with no New York properties.
This divergence suggests that insiders of New York REITs used their infor-
mation to increase the frequency of their selling activity, in anticipation of
the subsequent negative performance of the real market. Analysts followed
this trend, albeit with a delay. Indeed, all the financial reports that we found
issued in the ten days following 9/11 indicated that REIT analysts initially
expected New York REITs to benefit from the reduction in supply. However,
just one quarter later, the same analysts began to emphasize the fact that
the anticipated increased Manhattan demand was being eﬃciently absorbed
and lowered their price forecasts for New York REITs.
The organization of the paper is as follows. Section 2 describes the rel-
evant REIT data set; a discussion of the key aspects of the institutional
structure of these securitized assets is in the Appendix. Section 3 presents
and analyzes our empirical results. Section 4 investigates the significance
of several alternative explanations for the REITs’ reaction to the events of
September 11. Section 5 concludes.
2 Data Description
We construct our REIT sample from the SNL REIT database.12 We use
SNL’s classification to obtain all REITs having an oﬃce property orientation
(29 REITs), but exclude those with any exposure to downtown Manhattan
(Brookfield Properties and TriZecHahn Corporation). This leaves a sample
of 27 REITs, which we use in the analysis that follows. Since SNL also re-
12SNL Financial is the premier financial information provider for in-depth coverage of
the real estate sectors.
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ports the location and square feet13 of each property in a REIT’s portfolio,
we segment our sample of oﬃce REITs into those having a New York City or
New York metropolitan area exposure and those that do not. We define the
New York metropolitan area as New York City (excluding downtown Man-
hattan), the outer boroughs (Brooklyn, Queens, Staten Island, The Bronx),
Long Island (including Nassau and Suﬀolk), Westchester (including Rock-
land County), Southern Connecticut (including Fairfield, Hartford, and New
Haven counties), and Northern New Jersey (including the following counties:
Bergen, Essex, Hudson, Morris, Passaic, Sussex, Union, and Warren). For
each oﬃce REIT in our sample, we calculated the total square feet for its
oﬃce properties in New York City, and also in the New York metropolitan
area. We scaled these figures by dividing each by the total square feet of of-
fice space in the entire REIT portfolio. This yields the percentage of an oﬃce
REIT’s square footage that is in New York City (PctNYC) and the percent-
age of an oﬃce REIT’s square footage that is in the New York metropolitan
Area (PctNYMetro).
We obtained close-to-close daily REIT returns from CRSP, the three-
month Treasury Bill rate from the Federal Reserve,14 and the daily return on
theMorgan Stanley REIT Index (MSREIT), a capitalization-weighted bench-
mark index of the most actively traded REITs, over the interval 01/02/1998-
09/17/2001 from Bloomberg. Opening and closing daily prices for REITs as
well as the Dow Jones Industrial Average and the S&P500 from the close on
Monday, September 10, 2001 to the open and close of Monday, September
17, 2001 are obtained from the website http://finance.yahoo.com.
To assess the performance of the real markets we use the two most im-
portant valuation parameters in the real estate literature, the cap rate (i.e.,
the reciprocal of the EBITDA multiple) and the Net Asset Value (NAV).
Liu and Mei (1992) show that the real market, as proxied by the cap rate,
can predict equity REIT returns. Mei and Lee (1994) further find that the
real estate premium found in Liu and Mei (1992) captures the systematic
risk in the real estate market rather than real estate market imperfections.
Damodaran and Liu (1993) find that NAVs contain information, by show-
ing that insiders buy (sell) after they receive favorable (unfavorable) NAV
news, especially for negative appraisals. Finally, Gentry et al. (2004) reveal
that investors can profit from the deviations of REIT stock prices from their
NAVs; using REIT data since 1990, they find large positive excess returns
result from buying stocks trading at a discount to NAV, and shorting stocks
13The square footage is reported for most properties except those that are raw land and
those that are in the process of being developed (construction in progress).
14Http://www.federalreserve.gov/releases/#daily.
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trading at a premium to NAV. The authors also find that the average price
to NAV ratio is mean reverting toward one, implying that the aggregate price
to NAV ratio can be used to predict aggregate REIT returns. NAVs and cap
rates are also important tools for Wall Street REIT analysts. For example,
according to A. G. Edwards (2000), “... a NAV analysis provides practical
observations about the real estate value of a REIT relative to its public mar-
ket valuation. A NAV analysis is also helpful on a relative basis in making
decisions regarding the allocation of capital between direct real estate and
real estate in the REIT format.”
In this study, we take quarterly cap rates on real estate for New York and
the nation, starting from the second quarter of 1994, from three sources:
1. The American Council of Life Insurance (ACLI) publication Investment
Bulletin: Mortgage Commitments on Multifamily and Nonresidential
Properties reported by 20 life insurance companies;
2. The National Real Estate Index (NREI) Market Monitor;
3. Korpacz Real Estate Investor Survey published by Price Waterhouse
Coopers (PWC).15
As previously suggested, we compute the cap rate for each REIT as the
ratio between its EBITDA and firm value on its direct real estate invest-
ment.16 The inverse of the cap rate, known as the EBITDA multiple, is a
15The three sources of data diﬀer. The Korpacz Real Estate Investor Survey consists of
quarterly survey results from major institutional equity real estate market participants.
Those surveyed provide their expectations for returns on investments in institutional-
grade, real property. These expectations do not necessarily reflect the actual performance
of such property. In contrast, NREI reports actual transactions of large income-producing
properties and includes the transactions of REITs and real estate operating companies.
The index attempts to keep quality constant by tracking only commercial real estate
transactions that meet pre-specified property characteristics. The ACLI also reports actual
transactions of institutional grade real property made by 20 life insurance companies. The
ACLI data diﬀers from that of NREI in that no attempt is made to keep the quality
constant.
16Real estate practitioners define the cap rate as the ratio of “net stabilized” operating
income (NOI) to the transaction price (or market value) of a property. “Net stabilized”
means that the income figure used in the numerator assumes that full lease up of the
building has occurred such that the building’s vacancy is equal to or less than the vacancy
of the market. Operating income is the diﬀerence between total rental revenue from
properties and the corresponding property operating costs. The SNL REIT database
reports property income and expenses in addition to REIT (firm) income and expenses.
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very familiar valuation metric in finance.17 To value the property portfolio
of a REIT, we employ the cap rate valuation model commonly used by real
estate appraisers. A real estate appraiser first calculates the average cap
rate for comparable properties. Next, he/she multiplies the reciprocal of the
cap rate by the EBITDA of the appraised property (called the stabilized net
operating income) to obtain an estimate of the property value. Finally, the
mortgage amount is subtracted from the resulting value of the property to
obtain the value of the equity.
We also use the quarterly cap rates in conjunction with EBITDA for each
REIT taken from the SNL REIT database to calculate the NAV per share
for each REIT.18 Each REIT’s NAV is computed as the ratio between its
trailing twelve-month EBITDA and its blended cap rate. Individual blend
cap rates are weighted averages of either actual (from NREI and ACLI) or
expectational (from PWC) cap rates for both New York and the U.S., with
weights given by the REIT’s exposure to the NY metropolitan area (again
excluding downtown Manhattan). NAVs per share are computed to control
for the possibility that the REITs added properties to their portfolios and
financed the purchase with a secondary stock oﬀering. In the next section,
we compute the time series of internal rates of returns (IRRs) for each of the
REITs in our sample as the percentage quarterly change in these NAVs to
measure the actual performance of their underlying real assets following the
events of September 11.
3 Empirical Results
3.1 Results from the Financial Markets
Table 1 presents the basic characteristics of the 27 REITs in our sample as of
September 1, 2001. Each REIT was mainly involved in oﬃce properties, al-
though three REITs with substantial holdings in the New York metropolitan
area (Forest City Enterprises, Lexington, and Voronado) were more diversi-
fied. Our analysis will focus on the group of 12 that had significant exposure
to New York oﬃce properties (except downtown Manhattan, by construc-
17For example, in valuing the equity of a given firm a financial analyst using a relative
valuation methodology will compute the EBITDA multiple for a set of comparable firms.
The average of these multiples will be multiplied by the EBITDA for the subject firm to
estimate its enterprise value. Finally, the value of the firm’s debt is subtracted from the
estimated total firm value to impute the equity value.
18When these data were missing from the SNL REIT database, we obtained them from
the REITs’ 10Q forms.
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tion); we dub this group the New York REIT group.19 Of our New York
REIT sample, three had over half of their total holdings in the New York
area: SL Green (100%), Reckson Associates (93%) and Mack-Cali Realty
(62%). The remaining 15 had no investment in the New York area. They
represent a control sample in order to capture the more general eﬀects of
the event on the overall real estate market; we call this subset the national
group.
Table 2 documents the stock market behavior of these REITs over the
period from the close of the market on Monday September 10 to the open
(column 2) and close (column 3) on Monday September 17, the first trading
day after September 11. It is important to test the price behavior both at the
opening, which incorporates the information over the period of the market
closure, and, as a robustness check, at the close of the first trading day as
well. The latter in fact captures the impact of any new information on the
stock market’s reaction to the crisis and is unaﬀected by distortions that can
occur in opening prices. Panel A gives the unadjusted percentage change.
The New York group gained an average of 1.998% to the open, but gave
almost all of it back over the course of the trading day to close at a small
average gain of 0.390%. Conversely, the national group opened 2.075% lower
and then lost a further 1.291% to close at a loss of 3.366%. In both of these
cases the New York average is significantly greater than the national average
at the 5% level. This indicates that the market believed that the entire real
estate sector would suﬀer because of the event, but that (presumably because
of the supply reduction eﬀect) New York oﬃce REITs would appreciate in
value. Similarly, based on the standard deviation of returns, the dispersion of
opinion was significantly higher (at least at the 10% level) for the New York
group. The standard deviations at the open and close are in fact 5.683% and
3.493% for the New York group versus 1.676% and 2.344% for the national
group. Panel B performs the same calculations with New York REIT returns
relative to the Dow Jones 30 Index, which opened 6.798% lower than on
September 10 and lost another 1.32% during the day. The New York group
now shows a relative gain of 8.796% to the open and 8.509% to the close.
Table 3 presents the cross-sectional correlations of the REIT groups. It
shows that the correlation between the price change (close-to-open) and the
percentage of property held in the New York area (excluding downtown Man-
hattan) is 0.781. The same correlation versus just New York City is 0.600.
This suggests that the shock to supply is a strong factor in the market’s
revised value estimates. Figure 1 clarifies this correlation analysis. Figure
19In our subsequent analysis, we adjust for the relative proportions of properties within
and outside the New York area in each of these REITs.
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1a plots the percentage price change (close-to-open) versus the amount of
square footage in the New York metropolitan area. The positive slope is ob-
vious, as is the clustering of negative returns for REITs with zero New York
exposure. Figure 1b, which plots the same price change versus a REIT’s
percentage exposure to the New York metropolitan area presents a similar
picture. Again the slope is positive and REITs with zero New York exposure
have negative returns.
In Table 4 we estimate the (excess, if any) REIT market reaction to the
events of September 11. We use the following return generating process to
compute “normal” and “abnormal” returns:20
rCCit − rFt = αi + βi (rMt − rFt) + εit, (1)
where rCCit is the return on REIT i from the close on day t − 1 to the close
on day t, rFt is the yield on the 90-day Treasury bill on day t, and rMt
is the return on day t on the Morgan Stanley REIT index. Eq. (1) is
estimated over the interval January 2, 1998 - September 10, 2001 for each of
the REITs in the sample. We then use those coeﬃcients to compute normal
(i.e., benchmark) close-to-close REIT returns brCCiT∗ on day T ∗ = September
17, 2001, i.e., from the close on September 10 to the close on September 17.
The resulting R2s are quite high for daily data, averaging about 21%. The
average estimates of αi and βi in Eq. (1) are −0.0002 and 0.925, respectively,
indicating satisfactory performance of the benchmark. The national group
showed no abnormal returns as well: Each of the estimated αis is in fact
statistically insignificant.
According to Table 4, REITs with exposure to the New York metropoli-
tan area out-performed the overall U.S. real estate market by a statistically
significant 4.1% on average: rCCiT∗−brCCiT ∗ = 0.041 in row NY of Table 4. The su-
perior performance of the New York REIT group was even more pronounced
at the opening of trading. Normal close-to-close New York REIT returnsbrCCiT∗ from Eq. (1) are estimated to be about 5.7% lower than the correspond-
ing return from the close on September 10 to the open on September 17,
rCOit . Furthermore, estimated abnormal returns are the greatest for REITs
for which close-to-open returns rCOiT ∗ are positive on September 17; 88% of
those REITs had oﬃce properties in New York.
20Kallberg et al. (2000) show that a one-factor return generating process with a REIT
index as the factor performs as well as more complex models (e.g., using Fama-French and
other factors).
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3.2 Results from the Real Markets
The above evidence suggests that the REIT equity markets anticipated that
the supply reduction eﬀect would dominate the recessionary shock eﬀect and
thus moved the prices of REITs with New York exposure significantly higher
than REITs without New York exposure. We now turn our attention to the
actual performance of the underlying real assets over the three months that
followed the event. This interval was chosen in order to have enough time for
the key uncertainty surrounding the crisis to be resolved, but short enough
so that other exogenous factors do not begin to play an important role in
real asset returns.
Based on the observations in Section 2, we use a variety of measures of
real market performance based on expectational and realized data in order
to present a robust analysis. In particular, we focus on diﬀerent measures
of quarterly internal rates of return (IRRs) for each of the REITs in the
sample. We define REIT i’s IRR in quarter τ , , irriτ , as the percentage
change in its NAV over that period. Then, we compare those IRRs to bench-
mark IRRs given by weighted averages of New York and national real rates
of return. Specifically, we compute excess IRRs in three steps. First, we
compute “normal” quarterly real rates of return for NY oﬃce REITs esti-
mating the following regression over the time period 1994.Q2 to 2001.Q2 (29
observations):
irrNYτ − rF τ = α+ β (rUSτ − rF τ) + ητ , (2)
which mimics Eq. (1) using rates of return from real rather than financial
markets. Here irrNYτ is the estimated rate of return on our New York sample,
rF τ is the yield on the 90-day Treasury bill over quarter τ , and rUSτ is the
nation-wide real estate IRR in quarter τ from the Korpacz Data Index, which
is constructed with a variety of measures of real market performance (see
Section 2). Second, the resulting estimated coeﬃcients bα = 0.003 and bβ =
0.831, are used to compute “normal” NY REIT returns, cirrNYτ∗ = irrNYτ∗ −bητ∗
for τ ∗ = 2001.Q4, to control for the impact of the idiosyncratic events of
September 11 on the NY oﬃce business. The R2 of 83% indicates that Eq.
(2) does an excellent job of describing NYREITs’ real returns. Finally, excess
IRR for each REIT in quarter τ ∗ = 2001.Q4 is computed as the diﬀerence
between its quarterly IRR, irriτ∗, and the corresponding benchmark irrBiτ∗ =
ωicirrNYτ∗ + (1− ω1) rUSτ∗ , where ωi is the percentage of the REIT i’s oﬃce
space in the NY metro area reported in Table 1.
Table 5a reports estimated excess IRRs measured using the percentage
quarterly change in Net Asset Value (NAV) for each REIT in the sample
10
computed using three diﬀerent blend (i.e., weighted) cap rates: The NREI
data in columns 3 and 4, the ACLI data in columns 5 and 6, and the ex-
pectational data from PWC in columns 7 and 8 (see Section 2). The most
striking result is the diﬀerence between the ensuing average abnormal real
returns and the estimated excess REIT returns in Table 4. Table 5a shows
in fact that the real abnormal returns to the New York REITs over the quar-
ter immediately following 9/11 were either statistically significantly negative
(at the 2% level) or zero, in contrast to their positive relative performance
in the financial markets over the period of market closure (4.1% in Table
4). More specifically, the sample average abnormal real returns for NY RE-
ITs, irriτ∗ − irrBiτ∗, based on each of the three measures above, were −3.3%,
0.4%, and −3.0% (with t-statistics of −2.80, 0.30, and −2.83), respectively.
In addition, although the real market performance of the national group
was somewhat lower, according to each of our three metrics, the diﬀerences
between the two groups were never statistically significant. Yet, this com-
parison is somewhat inappropriate because of the diﬀerent benchmarks used
to compute abnormal performance in the two groups. Similarly, REITs that
increased in price from close-to-close out-performed those that lost by 3.3%,
3.6%, and 1.1%, respectively, while REITs that had positive returns at the
open on September 17, 2001 (rCOiT ∗ ≥ 0) out-performed those REITs with
negative returns at the open (rCOiT ∗ < 0) in two of the three cases (using NREI
and ACLI measures). Yet again none of these diﬀerences was statistically
significant.
Table 5b reports the same analysis when NAVs are calculated with only
U.S. cap rates, to ensure that our results are not driven by the procedure
used to compute blend cap rates. The results parallel those obtained in Table
5a. The under-performance of the New York group is now more pronounced,
and significantly negative, for each of the three measures. When comparing
those negative excess real return across subsets of our sample, we again find
that the New York group out-performed the national group, although now
the diﬀerences are much smaller: About 1.0% using either NREI, ACLI, or
PWC data. However, REITs that gained or lost during the first trading
day had virtually identical performance. Moreover, none of these diﬀerences
is statistically significant, as in Table 5a. We obtained similar results (not
reported here) by computing REIT IRRs from changes in their Net Equity
Values (NEV), equal to their NAVs minus Debt.
Finally, we further investigate the real performance of the New York oﬃce
market by computing four additional measures of real estate market dynam-
ics commonly used by practitioners: The nominal rent index, the going-in
cap rates, the expectational IRR, and the NEVs defined above. We find
that i) the nominal rent index for New York declined by 4.6% (versus an
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average of 2.6% for the rest of the U.S.);21 ii) the in-going cap rates for New
York actually increased by 10.1%, yet less so than the average of 10.6% for
markets outside New York;22 iii) expectational IRRs for New York increased
by 33 basis points versus an average decrease of 18 basis points for the rest
of the U.S.;23 iv) NEVs for the first nine months following 9/11 were not
significantly diﬀerent across the REITs with or without New York exposure
in our sample. Overall, this evidence, although somewhat mixed, on balance
corroborates our earlier analysis of excess IRRs: The real performance of
New York REITs was either weaker than or not statistically diﬀerent from
that of REITs with no such exposure.
4 Analyzing the Adjustments to Real Market
Conditions
Our analysis suggests that, while New York REITs experienced significantly
positive abnormal stock market returns from the close on September 10 to
the close on September 17, 2001, this superior performance did not material-
ize in the real asset markets. Specifically, in the quarter following September
11, the real asset markets in New York significantly under-performed relative
to their benchmarks, regardless of the measure of real asset performance em-
ployed. Armed with these results, we now turn to the major issue raised in
this study: How quickly did each of the three groups of market participants
we consider, insiders, analysts, and REIT equity investors, adjust to the real
market conditions? To address this issue, we first examine the trading behav-
ior of insiders in the months before and after 9/11. Secondly, we investigate
the recommendations of REIT analysts around the event. Finally, we exam-
ine the abnormal returns on New York REITs in the months subsequent to
the World Trade Center (WTC) attacks. As noted earlier, market eﬃciency
would imply that insiders (because of their superior information set) should
react first, followed by analysts (because of their superior access to insid-
ers’ information) and, lastly, the revised expectations of the overall market
should reduce REIT abnormal returns.
4.1 REIT Insiders
Figure 2 performs the first of these tests. It shows the cumulative sums of
scaled diﬀerences between total insider purchases and sales in REITs with
21Source: Torto-Wheaton.
22Source: American Council of Life Insurance (ACLI).
23Source: Price Waterhouse Coopers (Korpacz).
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(solid line) or without (dashed line) exposure to the New York metropolitan
area (excluding downtown Manhattan) that are sales. The data are obtained
from WRDS (Wharton Research Data Services) TFN Insider Filing Data
Files.24 If insiders correctly believed that the prices of REITs with New York
exposure would decline relative to their peers, then we should see a relatively
higher amount of selling by the insiders of New York REITs following the
terrorist attack to downtown Manhattan.
Figure 2 shows that, for the first seven months of 2001, the two cumulative
ratios were almost identical for REITs with and without New York exposure.
Indeed, the average percentage of sales was approximately 46% of all trades
for both groups. However, in the first three months after September 11,
insider sales exceeded insider purchases for REITs with New York exposure,
hence the corresponding ratio trended downward and turns negative, while
the ratio for the national group continued to trend upward. This divergence
in selling and buying patterns suggests that insiders of the New York group
used their information to increase the frequency of their selling activity.
The analysis of each of the trades reported by REIT insiders oﬀers fur-
ther evidence on the nature of their trading activity after September 11. In
particular, we focus on the first month following the terrorist attack. Over
this sample period, the total amount of trading by insiders of REITs not ex-
posed to the New York area was relatively small, totaling only $0.9 million.
Of these trades, 68% were sales; yet a single one, executed on September
17, 2001, dominated that balance, amounting to $0.57 million. In contrast,
trades by insiders of the New York group totaled $23.4 million. Of this to-
tal, about 99.9% were sales. These observations confirm our earlier finding
of significantly higher selling by New York REIT insiders immediately after
9/11, and are consistent with the notion that insiders believed the U.S. stock
market had temporarily overvalued those securities relative to other oﬃce
REITs.
4.2 REIT Analysts’ Reports
The second part of our analysis focuses on the behavior of REIT analysts
following the events of September 11. We searched Investext for analyst re-
ports regarding the impact of the WTC attacks on REITs issued around the
24This database, available at http://wrds.wharton.upenn.edu, contains all insider activ-
ity as reported on SEC forms 3, 4, 5, and 144. According to the WRDS documentation,
“Corporate insiders are defined broadly to include those that have ‘access to non-public,
material, insider information’ and these insiders are required to file SEC form 3, 4, and 5
when they trade in their companies stock.” We were unable to compute dollar amounts
for these trades because, in many cases, the actual transaction prices were not reported.
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time of the attack.25 As a specific illustration, we focus on analysts’ reports
for Mack-Cali (CLI), the NY REIT followed by the largest number of ana-
lysts in our sample.26 On August 16th, 2001 Morgan Stanley issued a note
maintaining its position that Mack Cali was expected to “under perform”
(even though they beat analyst estimates) based on erosion in market funda-
mentals and on the expected acceleration of their disposition program, which
was expected to dilute earnings.27 This negative opinion was partly based on
management lowering expected 2001 earnings to reflect potential occupancy
erosion in their portfolio, the sustainability of rental rates, and the timing
of the company’s ongoing capital recycling program. Prior to 9/11, REIT
analysts from other investment banks held a similar opinion about the New
York market and Mack-Cali in particular as Table 6 shows.
All the reports that we found issued in the ten days following 9/11 in-
dicated that REIT analysts expected New York area REITs to benefit from
the anticipated scramble for space in both Midtown and in NJ, CT, Long
Island, and Westchester based on an expected tightening of oﬃce market
space in the short run. For example, from Axelrod (2001), “The taking out
of 25 million square feet of Manhattan oﬃce space has dramatically tight-
ened the entire NYCmetro oﬃce market which stood at 7.5% vacancy (direct
and sublease, Manhattan only) at the end of Q201. However, for the rest
of the national oﬃce markets, a recession is a decided negative.” Given this
anticipated reduction in supply, analysts raised their target price for REITs
having a New York presence. From Raiman et al. (2001), “... in response
to shrinkage of oﬃce supply in Manhattan - and its positive implication on
the tri-state market, we are raising our target price to $34-$35 on Mack-Cali
Realty given its oﬃce concentration in the Tri-State area.”
However, analysts just one quarter later emphasized the fact that the
anticipated occupancy pressure was not oﬀset with increased Manhattan de-
mand. As noted in Litt (2001), “The vast amount of ’phantom vacancy’ that
appeared in Manhattan following the attack will likely limit some of the up-
side we expected in Mack-Cali’s 2002 occupancy as many displaced tenants
have found space in Manhattan.” Taylor (2001) agreed, stating that “... the
WTC impact was short lived ... tenants in midtown New York have been
25Investext is currently the world’s largest online database of company and industry
investment research reports. These reports are not generally available through public
channels.
26In addition, Mack-Cali had a sizable presence in the New York metropolitan area as of
September 1, 2001 (about 62% of its oﬃce properties, based on square footage, according
to Table 1).
27This report, Whyte (2001), was the last analyst report issued on Mack-Cali prior to
the attack on the World Trade Center.
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rethinking their space needs and giving up space. This has relaxed the tight-
ness in the NYC market that had driven demand to Harborside (in Jersey
City, NJ). Like most investors and analysts, we thought there’d be a benefit
from the loss of space in Manhattan. We thought it would be short term,
but not this short.” Finally, Paolone (2001) noted in a report made available
on November 7, 2001 that ”At this point, much of the scramble for space
is over as a result of September 11th and the bigger impact is on the nega-
tive side as demand wanes.” As shown in Table 6, Morgan Stanley, Lehman
Brothers, Banc of America, and Salomon Smith Barney all initially raised
their earnings estimates immediately following 9/11, but then all lowered
those estimates between November 8 and 12, 2001. Deutsche Banc issued no
updates to its August 10 earnings forecasts in response to the terrorist at-
tack until it confirmed them on November 8, only to reduce its 2002 earnings
estimates the following day. CS First Boston issued a strong buy on Septem-
ber 18, 2001 but released no further report until May of 2002. The timing
and content of analysts’ recommendations on the other NY REITs in our
sample over that period provide a strikingly similar picture. For instance, of
the analysts that published earnings estimates for REITs with NY exposure
both in the two weeks following 9/11 and in either October or the first two
weeks of November, downgrades out-numbered upgrades by more than three
to one. These reports collectively suggest that analysts reversed their initial
positive outlook approximately two months after 9/11.
4.3 The Aggregate Market
Lastly, we examine the abnormal returns on New York REITs in the weeks
and months immediately following 9/11. Indeed, if the relative values of
New York REITs were actually declining, we would expect to see all mar-
ket participants eventually revise their initial expectations rationally, hence
the positive abnormal returns registered on September 17, 2001 (reported in
Table 4) eventually decline (towards zero) as well. This third test is per-
formed in Figure 3, which plots cumulative abnormal returns (CARs, solid
line) for the REITs with NY exposure listed in Table 1 over the nine-month
sample period from September 17, 2001 to June 17, 2002. We also plot a
95% confidence interval (dashed lines) under the null hypothesis of no cumu-
lative excess returns. CARs are generated by first computing close-to-close
abnormal returns (ARs) estimated using the market model of Eq. (1) over
the interval January 2, 1998 - September 10, 2001 (in Table 4) and then
aggregating them over time and across REITs.
CARs are initially highly positive and significant, as a result of the rel-
atively superior performance of this group immediately after September 11.
15
However, the solid line drifts quickly downward, crossing the upper bound of
the confidence interval in early November before reaching zero immediately
afterwards. In the following seven months, the CARs remain relatively small
and almost always statistically indistinguishable from zero. Hence, Figure
3 shows that although the markets initially expected that 9/11 would have
a positive impact on New York REITs, REIT prices quickly reflected the
underlying behavior of the real markets. Interestingly, the sharp decline in
abnormal returns exhibited in Figure 3 begins on November 7 and lasts until
November 19, i.e., around the time analysts started revising downward their
EPS forecasts for NY REITs (e.g., the sequence of downgrades for Mack-Cali
between November 8 and 12, 2001 in Table 6). This is consistent with the
notion that financial markets eventually reacted to negative analysts’ reports
on those REITs’ future earnings.
4.4 Real Market Frictions
While it is impossible to rigorously evaluate the possible reasons for those
estimated diﬀerences in timing, sign, and/or magnitude of the reactions of
real and financial markets, as well as of various groups of market participants,
to the events of 9/11, one issue is clear. Analysts and the financial markets
initially anticipated that, in the New York metro area, the supply reduction
eﬀect would be suﬃcient to generate relatively superior returns to REITs
with exposure to the New York oﬃce market. However, as we documented
above, this superior performance did not materialize, at least not in the short
run.
Real estate practitioners primarily attribute this disparity to two sources.
In essence, these arguments involve the fact that employers laid oﬀ workers
faster than they could layoﬀ space. This factor, coupled with excess space
known as “shadow”28 space by New York metro area employers, resulted in
28The National Association of Realtors (NAR) defines shadow space as space that isn’t
being occupied by the tenant but isn’t being actively marketed either. Shadow space is
a diﬃcult number to obtain. In an RCA (Realtors Commercial Alliance) Report dated
Fall 2003, Torto Wheaton research estimated that nationwide, shadow space represents
an additional 3% of unoccupied space that is not reflected in vacancy numbers. Mitchell
Stein, CEO of Julien J. Studley Inc., a commercial leasing agent, stated in the same report
that shadow space for Manhattan accounts for between 2.5% to 3.5% (10 to 14 million
square feet) of unoccupied space. Shadow space exists not only because firms can lay oﬀ
workers faster than they can lay oﬀ space but also because companies worry they won’t
be able to find space in the future and thus take more than they presently require. There
are other reasons why space remains in the shadows. These reasons include the fact that
very small amounts of space are diﬃcult to lease as well as space with only one to two
years remaining on a lease is unmarketable except to very flexible tenants. Also the cost
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a suﬃcient supply of space for displaced tenants. According to Grubb &
Ellis (2001), by December 2001, permanently displaced tenants contracted
to take only 48% as much space as they had formerly occupied. In addition,
since September 11, New York companies that were not directly eﬀected re-
evaluated their space needs and oﬀered an additional 10.1 million square feet
of space available for sublet. Much of this additional sublet space came from
Wall Street firms. Consequently, the amount of displaced tenants that were
expected to lease new space somewhere in Manhattan was not as large as
anticipated.
In addition to a reduction in the demand for space, corporations also
downsized their workforce in the post 9-11 period. In New York City, the
securities industry alone lost 9, 800 jobs; a total of 31, 100 private sector jobs
were lost in 2002, as the unemployment rate rose to 8.4%. Besides an increase
in vacancy, the anticipated increase in rents did not materialize in part due to
the Real Estate Board of New York’s (REBNY) written memo to its members
that “Any member owner, firm, or broker found to be taking advantage of
this terrible tragedy will be expelled from the Real Estate Board.”29 While
some critics might argue that expectations might not have been realized
because tenants moved out of the New York metro area, Table 7 shows that
only a small portion (5.4%) of tenants relocated outside of the metro area.
The overwhelming majority of displaced tenants (84.9%) chose to remain in
New York City.
Finally, we consider the possibility that the discrepancy between the rel-
ative performance of financial and real markets for the NY REITs in our
sample following September 11 may be due, at least in part, to the arrival of
idiosyncratic news aﬀecting those REITs between September 10 and Septem-
ber 17, 2001. We check for this argument by examining all relevant informa-
tion events taking place for each of the 27 REITs in our sample over that
interval of time. The ensuing sequence of these events (from Lexis-Nexus),
reported in Table 8, suggests that none of the REITs under examination expe-
rienced information shocks significant enough to bias our statistical analysis,
i.e., to contribute to the abnormal returns estimated in Table 4.
to reconfigure the space to make it subleasable might not be justified.
29According to the information reported on the website http://www.property-
mag.com/property/Winter02/coverstory_print.html, REBNY urged its members not to
take advantage of displaced tenants when negotiating lease rates and suggested using
rental rates in place prior to September 11. REBNY also asked brokers to waive their
usual commissions and fees in assisting displaced tenants who required short-term (less
than 12 months) leases.
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5 Conclusions
The ability of financial markets to process available information quickly and
accurately is the cornerstone of modern theories of market eﬃciency. This
study examined how three diﬀerent groups of market participants - insiders,
analysts, and the general market - revised their beliefs in response to a dra-
matic and unexpected event, the terrorist attacks on September 11, 2001, and
how their reactions compared to the subsequent behavior of the real asset
markets. To that end, we analyzed the dynamics of returns of REITs ex-
posed to the New York metropolitan area. Two of the unique aspects of this
study (as compared to the existing literature on economic shocks) are that
(i) the events of September 11 were completely unprecedented and totally
unanticipated, hence could not have been built into the market’s prior ex-
pectations and prices, and (ii) the potential impact of those events on REIT
returns was ambiguous, since it was uncertain if the resulting reduced supply
of oﬃce space in New York (the supply reduction eﬀect) would dominate the
negative repercussions of 9/11 for the local and national economy (the reces-
sionary shock eﬀect). A further distinguishing feature of our study is that
we focus on the speed with which these three groups of markets participants
were able to incorporate the performance of the underlying real asset market
into their expectations for REIT performance.
We found economically and statistically significant evidence of a diver-
gence between financial and real markets’ assessment of the impact of the
events of September 11 on New York REITs’ valuations. Indeed, returns
on New York oﬃce REITs from the close on September 10 to the close on
September 17 and returns in the underlying real markets over the following
quarter moved in opposite directions. NewYork REITs showed a significantly
positive abnormal return of 4.1%, while the corresponding real markets over
the last quarter of 2001 showed significantly negative abnormal returns for
five of our six measures of real performance. In short, our analysis revealed
that, in the short run, REITs with significant exposure to the New York
market outperformed REITs without any New York exposure; in contrast,
in the underlying real asset markets, New York properties experienced either
significantly negative or no abnormal performance with respect to similar
oﬃce properties in the U.S. over the first quarter following 9/11. These lat-
ter results also provide additional evidence on the resiliency of real product
markets in response to catastrophic events. According to our analysis, the
New York real estate market was in fact able to absorb an enormous shock
without suﬀering huge price increases or severe shortages. This is consistent
with the findings of Davis and Weinstein (2002, 2004) for post World War II
Japan and other settings.
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Consistent with notions of market eﬃciency, we also found that insiders
updated their expectations more accurately and faster than analysts, who in
turn revised their expectations more accurately and faster than the aggre-
gate market. Specifically, insiders were the first to lower their expectations
consistently with the real market. For example, in the month following the
re-opening of U.S. financial markets, insider trading in REITs with New York
exposure was 26 times insider trading in REITs of comparable total market
capitalizations but without New York exposure. Further, sales represented
99.9% of the total volume of insider trades in New York REITs, but just 68%
of the total volume of insider trades in REITs with no New York properties.
Analysts were almost as quick to adjust their recommendations: After being
initially optimistic about the New York oﬃce market, by early November
most REIT analysts had lowered their EPS and stock price targets for New
York REITs. Lastly, REIT stock prices adjusted to reflect the underlying
real market behavior; indeed, abnormal REIT returns had disappeared by
the end of November 2001. These findings are remarkable since they sug-
gest that both financial and real markets responded eﬃciently to a massive,
unprecedented, and wholly unexpected shock to the economy.
Finally, we investigated some plausible explanations for the diﬀerences in
the behavior of real and financial markets following the events of 9/11. In
particular, we explored whether confounding news could have contributed to
the run-up of REIT stock prices. Yet, we could not identify any significant
idiosyncratic information shock taking place during the ensuing one-week
market shut-down for any of the REITs in our sample. The weaker-than-
expected real performance of NY REITs appeared instead to be related to
the ability of many downtown firms to reduce space requirements, after the
forced relocation, and to lower-than-expected actual vacancy rates, as argued
by real estate practitioners.
6 Appendix: Institutional Features of REITs
Congress created REITs in 1960 to provide individual investors a vehicle
for owning income-producing real estate through pooling arrangements. The
early REIT issues were viewed as passive diversification plays for individual
investors but, as the market developed, they became alternatives to direct
real estate investment for institutional investors.
It is important to our study to realize that the REIT structure make the
analysis of their dynamics less diﬃcult than for the typical equity. As detailed
below, there are severe restrictions on dividend payout, which means that a
REIT manager has much less discretionary cash flow than the manager of
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a normal corporation. In addition, the law restricts the types of activities
in which a REIT can engage, thus limiting the manager’s opportunities to
fund negative NPV projects or projects that have significant private benefits.
Finally, because the holdings of a REIT, mostly physical properties, are
public knowledge, the informational asymmetry with respect to the average
investor is also reduced. This is important when considering the implications
of the WTC attacks on REIT’s valuation.
A REIT is not taxed at the firm level if it satisfies the provisions outlined
below. These regulations are designed to ensure that REITs, which hold a
portfolio of properties and/or mortgages for the long term, will be passive
investment vehicles similar in concept to open-ended mutual funds.
1. At least 95% of net annual taxable income is distributed to sharehold-
ers;30
2. At least 75% of annual gross income comes from rents, mortgage in-
terest, gains from selling real estate, and dividends from investing in
other REITs;
3. At least 75% of all assets consists of real estate, mortgages on real
estate, shares of other REITs, cash, or government securities;
4. At least 95% of the REIT’s gross income comes from items qualifying
under the 75% income test, dividends and interest income, and gains
from the sale of stock and other securities;
5. At least 100 shareholders must exist with no more than 50 percent of
the shares held by five or fewer shareholders;
6. It must elect to be treated as a REIT;
7. Real property must not be held primarily for sale in the ordinary course
of business (gains from the sale of property held for less than four years
must comprise less than 30% of gross income);
8. Trustees, directors or employees of a REIT are restricted from actively
managing or operating REIT property, although they are permitted to
make property decisions if such decisions relate to the business of the
REIT itself.
30Recent regulatory changes (eﬀective in the beginning of 2001) have changed this to
90% of taxable income.
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The REIT market has undergone numerous structural changes since its
inception in 1960. REITs formed during the 1960s and 1970s were mostly
engaged in higher-risk development and construction loans, and were ill-
positioned to withstand the real estate crash of the mid 1970s. REITs cre-
ated in the 1980s were basically passive, diversified holdings of real estate.
Most were finite-horizon REITs, which limited their growth potential. This
market structure changed dramatically in the 1990s. The new REITs fea-
tured active management, low leverage, infinite lives and substantial insider
holdings (often more than a third of the outstanding shares). These changes
led to greater institutional ownership, as documented in Ling and Ryngaert
(1997). For the pre-1990 REITs, institutional shareholders usually held less
than 10% of the outstanding shares one quarter after the IPO. The corre-
sponding figure for the post-1990 REITs is 42%.
References
[1] Axelrod, S. (2001). Morning Meeting Note. Lehman Brothers, Septem-
ber 21, 2001.
[2] A.G. Edwards (2000). Equity Oﬃce Properties.
[3] Barrett, W., A. Heuson, R. Kolb, G. Schropp (1987). The Adjustment
of Stock Prices to Completely Unanticipated Events. The Financial Re-
view, 22, pp. 345-354.
[4] Carter, D., B. Simkins (2002). Do Markets React Rationally? The Ef-
fect of the September 11th Tragedy on Airline Stock Returns. Working
paper, Oklahoma State University.
[5] Chan, W. (2003). Stock Price Reaction to News and No-News: Drift
and Reversal After Headlines. Journal of Financial Economics, 70, pp.
223-260.
[6] Cohen, R., P. Gompers, T. Vuolteenaho (2002). Who Underreacts to
Cash-Flow News? Evidence from Trading Between Individuals and In-
stitutions. Journal of Financial Economics, 66, pp. 409-462.
[7] Cowles, A. (1933). Can Stock Market Forecasters Forecast? Economet-
rica, 1, pp. 309-324.
[8] Daniel, K., D. Hirschleifer, A. Subrahmanyam (1998). Investor Psychol-
ogy and Security Market Under- and Over-Reactions. Journal of Fi-
nance, 53, pp. 1839-1885.
21
[9] Damodaran, A., C. Liu (1993). Insider Trading as a Signal of Private
Information. Review of Financial Studies, 6, pp. 79-120.
[10] Davis, D., D. Weinstein. (2002). Bones, Bombs, and Break Points: The
Geography of Economic Activity. American Economic Review, 92, pp.
1269-1289.
[11] Davis, D., D. Weinstein. (2004). A Search for Multiple Equilibria in
Urban Industrial Structure. NBER Working Paper No. 10252.
[12] DeBondt, W., R. Thaler (1985). Does the Stock Market Overreact?
Journal of Finance, 40, pp. 793-805.
[13] DeBondt, W., R. Thaler (1987). Further Evidence on Investor Overreac-
tion and Stock Market Seasonality. Journal of Finance, 42, pp. 557-581.
[14] DeBondt, W., R. Thaler (1990). Do Security Analysts Overreact? Amer-
ican Economic Review, 80, pp. 52-57.
[15] Doherty, N., J. Lamm-Tennant, L. Starks (2003). Insuring September
11th: Market Recovery and Transparency. The Journal of Risk and Un-
certainty, 26, pp. 179-199.
[16] Elton, E., M. Gruber, M. Gultekin (1984). Professional Expectations:
Accuracy and Diagnosis of Errors. Journal of Financial and Quantitative
Analysis, 19, pp. 351-363.
[17] Fama, E. (1991). Eﬃcient Markets II. Journal of Finance, 46, pp. 1575-
1617.
[18] Fama, E. (1998). Market Eﬃciency, Long Term Returns and Behavioral
Finance. Journal of Financial Economics, 49, pp. 283-306.
[19] Fama, E., L. Fisher, M. Jensen, R. Roll (1969). The Adjustment of
Stock Prices to New Information. International Economic Review, 10,
pp. 1-21.
[20] French, K., R. Roll (1986). Stock Return Variances: The Arrival of In-
formation and the Reaction of Traders. Journal of Financial Economics,
17, pp. 5-26.
[21] Garmaise, M., T. Moskowitz (2004). Confronting Information Asymme-
tries: Evidence for Real Estate Markets. Review of Financial Studies,
17, pp. 405-437.
22
[22] Gentry, W., C. Jones, C. Mayer (2004). REIT Reversion: Stock Price
Adjustments to Fundamental Value. Working Paper, Columbia Univer-
sity.
[23] Grubb and Ellis Research, 2001. NYC’s Oﬃce Market - A Post 9-11
Update. December.
[24] Jegadeesh, N. (1990). Evidence of Predictable Behavior of Security
Prices. Journal of Finance, 45, pp. 881-898.
[25] Jegadeesh, N., S. Titman (1995). Overreaction, Delayed Reaction, and
Contrarian Profits. Review of Financial Studies, 8, pp. 973-993.
[26] Kahneman, D., A. Tversky (1973). On the Psychology of Prediction.
Psychological Review, 80, pp. 237-251.
[27] Kallberg, J., C. Liu, C. Trzcinka (2000). The Value Added from In-
vestment Managers: An Examination of Funds of REITs. Journal of
Financial and Quantitative Analysis, 35, pp. 387-408.
[28] Lamb, R. (1995). An Exposure-Based Analysis of Property-Liability In-
surer Stock Values around Hurricane Andrew. The Journal of Risk and
Insurance, 62, pp. 111-123.
[29] Ling, C., M. Ryngaert (1997). Valuation Uncertainty, Institutional In-
volvement, and the under-pricing of IPOs: The Case of REITs. Journal
of Financial Economics, 43, pp. 433 - 456.
[30] Litt, J. (2001). Mack-Cali (CLI): Occupancy Pressure Not Oﬀset with
Increased Manhattan Demand. Salomon Smith Barney, November 8,
2001.
[31] Liu, C., J. Mei (1992). The Predictability of Returns on Equity RE-
ITs and Their Co-Movement with Other Assets. Journal of Real Estate
Finance and Economics, 5, pp. 401-418.
[32] Mei, J., A. Lee. (1994). Is There a Real Estate Factor Premium. Journal
of Real Estate Finance and Economics, 9, pp. 113-26.
[33] National Association of Realtors, RCA (Realtors Commercial Alliance)
Report, Volume 4, Issue 4, Fall 2003, p. 4.
[34] Paolone, A. (2001). Reckson Associates. CIBC World Markets, Novem-
ber 7.
23
[35] Raiman, L., Dembski, M., Habermann, J., Schwalbe, J. (2001). Morning
Meeting Note. Credit Suisse First Boston, September 17, 2001.
[36] Schwert, G. W. (2003). Anomalies and Stock Market Eﬃciency. Hand-
book of the Economics of Finance, Volume 1B, G. Constantinides, M.
Harris and R. Stulz editors, Elsevier Press, Amsterdam.
[37] Shiller, R. (1981). Do Stock Prices Move Too Much to Be Justified by
Subsequent Changes in Dividends? American Economic Review, 75, pp.
421-436.
[38] Shiller, R.(1989). Market Volatility, MIT Press, Cambridge MA.
[39] Sinkey, J., D. Carter (1999). The Reaction of Bank Stock Prices to
News of Derivatives Losses by Corporate Clients. Journal of Banking
and Finance, 21, pp. 1725-1743.
[40] Smirlock, M., H. Kaufold (1987). Bank Foreign Lending, Mandatory
Disclosure Rules and the Reaction of Bank Stock Prices to the Mexican
Debt Crisis. Journal of Business, 60, pp. 347-364.
[41] Straetmans, S., W. Verschoor, C. Wolﬀ (2003). Extreme U.S. Stock
Market Fluctuations in the Wake of 9/11. Working Paper, Maastricht
University.
[42] Taylor, L., T. Goebel (2001). CLI: WTC Impact Is Short-Lived.
Deutsche Banc Alex Brown Inc., November 9, 2001.
[43] Veronesi, P. (1999). Stock Market Overreaction to Bad News in Good
Times: A Rational Expectations Equilibrium Model. Review of Finan-
cial Studies, 12, pp. 975-1007.
[44] Whyte, G. (2001). Mack-Cali Realty: CLI; 2001 Guided Lower Despite
2Q01 Beat. Morgan Stanley, August 16, 2001.
24
Table 1. Sample REITs
This table provides basic information for each of the 27 REITs included in our sam-
ple as of September 1, 2001. The column labeled NY indicates the percentage of oﬃce
space (in square feet) in the NY metro area in the portfolio of the corresponding REIT.
The NY metro area includes New York City (but not downtown Manhattan), the outer
boroughs (Brooklyn, Queens, Staten Island, The Bronx), Long Island (including Nassau
and Suﬀolk), Westchester (including Rockland County), Southern CT (including Fairfield,
Hartford, and New Haven counties), and Northern NJ (including the following counties:
Bergen, Essex, Hudson, Morris, Passaic, Sussex, Union, and Warren).
REIT name Ticker Property focus Region NY
Alexandria Real Estate Equities ARE Oﬃce WE 0.00%
AmeriVest Properties AMV Oﬃce SW 0.00%
Arden Realty ARI Oﬃce WE 0.00%
Bedford Property Investors BED Oﬃce WE 0.00%
Boston Properties BXP Oﬃce NE 18.37%
Brandywine Realty BDN Oﬃce MA 1.75%
CarrAmerica Realty CRE Oﬃce MA 0.00%
Corporate Oﬃce Properties OFC Oﬃce MA 3.19%
Crescent Real Estate Equities CEI Oﬃce SW 0.00%
Duke Realty DRE Oﬃce MW 0.00%
Equity Oﬃce Properties EOP Oﬃce MW 5.18%
Forest City Enterprises FCEA Diversified / Other MW 38.53%
Glenborough Realty GLB Oﬃce WE 4.58%
Great lakes REIT GL Oﬃce MW 0.00%
Highwood Properties HIW Oﬃce SE 0.00%
HRPT Properties HRP Oﬃce NE 32.29%
Kilroy Realty KRC Oﬃce WE 0.00%
Koger Equity KE Oﬃce SE 0.00%
Lexington Properties LXP Diversified / Other MA 8.55%
Mack-Cali Realty CLI Oﬃce MA 61.71%
Mission West Properties MSW Oﬃce WE 0.00%
Parkway Properties PKY Oﬃce SE 0.00%
Prentiss Properties PP Oﬃce SW 0.00%
Prime Group Realty PGE Oﬃce MW 0.00%
Reckson Associates Realty RA Oﬃce MA 93.48%
SL Green Realty SLG Oﬃce MA 100.00%
Vornado Realty VNO Diversified / Other MA 43.26%
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Table 2. Market reaction
This table analyzes relative price changes of the REITs in our sample from the close
on 09/10/2001 to the open and close of 09/17/2001. REITs with some NY metro exposure
(see Table 1) are compared to those with none (Panel A) or to the Dow Jones Industrial
Average (DJIA, Panel B), using one and two-tailed t-tests for average price changes and
one-tailed F -tests for their variances. A “ ∗ ” indicates significance of the t-statistic at
the 5% level. P(F ≤ f) is the probability that two variances are not significantly diﬀerent.
Panel A: REIT comparison
close-to-open close-to-close
Average price change
Some NY metro exposure 1.998% 0.390%
No NY metro exposure -2.075% -3.366%
t statistic
P(T ≤ t) one-tail
t critical one-tail
P(T ≤ t) two-tail
t critical two-tail
2.647∗
0.007
1.708
0.014
2.060
3.337∗
0.001
1.708
0.003
2.060
Standard deviation of price change
Some NY metro exposure 5.683% 3.493%
No NY metro exposure 1.676% 2.344%
F statistic
P(F ≤ f) one-tail
F critical one-tail
0.087
0.000
0.390
0.450
0.081
0.390
Panel B: NY REITs versus DJIA
close-to-open close-to-close
Average price change
Some NY metro exposure 1.998% 0.390%
DJIA -6.798% -8.119%
t statistic
P(T ≤ t) one-tail
t critical one-tail
P(T ≤ t) two-tail
t critical two-tail
4.095∗
0.000
1.684
0.000
2.021
3.667∗
0.000
1.684
0.000
2.021
Average standard deviation of price change
Some NY metro exposure 5.683% 3.493%
DJIA 6.505% 7.682%
F statistic
P(F ≤ f) one-tail
F critical one-tail
0.763
0.328
0.388
0.207
0.004
0.388
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Table 3. Cross-sectional REIT correlations
This table reports cross-sectional correlations between observed price changes (from
the close on Monday September 10, 2001 to the open of Monday September 17, 2001) for
the REITs in our sample, their square footage in the New York metropolitan area (NY
metro, including Northern NJ, Southern CT, Long Island, and Westchester, but excluding
downtown Manhattan), their percentage square footage of oﬃce space in New York City
(PctNYC, computed as the ratio between New York City oﬃce square feet and square feet
of oﬃce space in the entire REIT portfolio), and their percentage square footage in the
entire New York metropolitan area (PctNYMetro, computed as the ratio between New
York metropolitan oﬃce square feet, excluding Manhattan, and square feet of oﬃce space
in the entire REIT portfolio).
Price change NY metro PctNYC PctNYMetro
Price change 1.000
NY metro 0.827 1.000
PctNYC 0.603 0.644 1.000
PctNYMetro 0.781 0.842 0.746 1.000
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Table 5a. Real asset behavior: NAV, IRR, & blend cap rates
This table reports estimates of excess quarterly REIT internal rates of return (or IRR
(irriτ )) for 2001.Q4. Excess IRRs are computed in three steps. First, we estimate the
following market model for the New York City IRR Index (irrNY τ ):
irrNYτ − rF τ = α+ β (rUSτ − rF τ) + ητ , (2)
where rF τ is the three-month Treasury Bill rate and rUSτ is the quarterly U.S. IRR
Index from Korpacz Data (computed on unleveraged, all cash transactions). The model
of Eq. (2) is estimated over 29 quarterly observations between 1994.Q2 and 2001.Q2.
Second, the resulting coeﬃcients’ OLS estimates, bα = 0.0027 (and a t-statistic of 2.27)
and bβ = 0.8305 (and a t-statistic of 11.66), with R2 = 83.43%, are then used to
measure the “normal” NY IRR cirrNYτ . Finally, excess IRR for each REIT when τ ∗
= 2001.Q4 is computed as the diﬀerence between the percentage quarterly change in
Net Asset Value (NAV) per share with respect to 2001.Q3, irriτ∗ , and its benchmark
irrBiτ∗ = ωicirrNYτ∗ + (1− ω1) rUSτ∗ , where ωi is the percentage of the REIT i’s oﬃce
space in the NY metro area reported in Table 1. Each REIT’s NAV is computed as the
ratio between its TTMNOI and its blend cap rate. A REIT’s TTMNOI is the diﬀerence
between its Trailing Twelve Months Total Rental Revenue and its Property Operating
Revenues. Individual blend cap rates are weighted averages of either actual (from NREI
and ACLI) or expectational (from PWC) weighted cap rates for both New York and the
U.S. (see Section 2), with weights given by the REIT’s exposure to the NY metro area
(in Table 1). NEVs per share are computed to control for the possibility that the REITs
added properties to their portfolios and financed the purchase with a secondary stock
oﬀering. For each excess IRR we report its mean (µ) and standard deviation (σ) across
various subsets of the sample (all REITs in Table 1, REITs with positive or negative rCCiT∗ ,
REITs with or without NY metro area exposure, and REITs with positive or negative rCOiT∗ ,
where T ∗ = 09/17/2001). The column labeled NY indicates the corresponding percentage
of REITs with oﬃce space in the NY metro area, excluding downtown Manhattan. A “ ∗
” and “ ∗∗ ” indicate significance at the 10% and 5% level, respectively.
irrNREIiτ∗ − irrBiτ∗ irrACLIiτ∗ − irrBiτ∗ irrPWCiτ∗ − irrBiτ∗
N µ σ µ σ µ σ NY
Total 27 -0.048∗∗ 0.09 -0.013 0.09 -0.034∗ 0.09 44%
rCCiT ∗ ≥ 0 7 -0.024 0.05 0.014 0.06 -0.026 0.05 71%
rCCiT ∗ < 0 20 -0.057
∗∗
0.10 -0.022 0.10 -0.037 0.11 35%
NY 12 -0.033∗∗ 0.04 0.004 0.04 -0.030∗∗ 0.04 100%
NO NY 15 -0.060∗ 0.12 -0.026 0.12 -0.038 0.12 0%
rCOiT ∗ ≥ 0 8 -0.029∗ 0.04 0.009 0.05 -0.036∗∗ 0.03 88%
rCOiT ∗ < 0 19 -0.056
∗∗
0.11 -0.022 0.10 -0.034 0.11 26%
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Table 5b. Real asset behavior: NAV, IRR, & U.S. cap rates
This table reports estimates of excess quarterly REIT internal rates of return (or IRR
(irriτ )) for 2001.Q4. Excess IRRs are computed in three steps. First, we estimate the
following market model for the New York City IRR Index (irrNY τ ):
irrNYτ − rF τ = α+ β (rUSτ − rF τ) + ητ , (2)
where rFt is the three-month Treasury Bill rate and rUSτ is the quarterly U.S. IRR
Index from Korpacz Data (computed on unleveraged, all cash transactions). The model
of Eq. (2) is estimated over 29 quarterly observations between 1994.Q2 and 2001.Q2.
Second, the resulting coeﬃcients’ OLS estimates, bα = 0.0027 (and a t-statistic of 2.27)
and bβ = 0.8305 (and a t-statistic of 11.66), with R2 = 83.43%, are then used to
measure the “normal” NY IRR cirrNYτ . Finally, excess IRR for each REIT when τ ∗
= 2001.Q4 is computed as the diﬀerence between the percentage quarterly change in
Net Asset Value (NAV) per share with respect to 2001.Q3, irriτ∗ , and its benchmark
irrBiτ∗ = ωicirrNYτ∗ + (1− ω1) rUSτ∗ , where ωi is the percentage of the REIT i’s oﬃce
space in the NYmetro area reported in Table 1. Each REIT’s NAV is computed as the ratio
between its TTMNOI and the U.S. cap rate. A REIT’s TTMNOI is the diﬀerence between
its Trailing Twelve Months Total Rental Revenue and its Property Operating Revenues.
Individual U.S. cap rates are either actual (from NREI and ACLI) or expectational (from
PWC) cap rates for the U.S. (see Section 2). NEVs per share are computed to control
for the possibility that the REITs added properties to their portfolios and financed the
purchase with a secondary stock oﬀering. For each excess IRR we report its mean (µ)
and standard deviation (σ) across various subsets of the sample (all REITs in Table 1,
REITs with positive or negative rCCiT ∗ , REITs with or without NY metro area exposure,
and REITs with positive or negative rCOit , where T
∗ = 09/17/2001). The column labeled
NY indicates the corresponding percentage of REITs with oﬃce space in the NY metro
area, excluding downtown Manhattan. A “ ∗ ” and “ ∗∗ ” indicate significance at the 10%
and 5% level, respectively.
irrNREIiτ∗ − irrBiτ∗ irrACLIiτ∗ − irrBiτ∗ irrPWCiτ∗ − irrBiτ∗
N µ σ µ σ µ σ NY
Total 27 -0.059∗∗ 0.09 -0.026 0.09 -0.033∗ 0.09 44%
rCCiT ∗ ≥ 0 7 -0.049∗∗ 0.05 -0.016 0.05 -0.023 0.05 71%
rCCiT ∗ < 0 20 -0.063
∗∗
0.11 -0.029 0.11 -0.037 0.11 35%
NY 12 -0.054∗∗ 0.04 -0.020∗ 0.04 -0.028∗∗ 0.04 100%
NO NY 15 -0.064∗ 0.12 -0.030 0.12 -0.038 0.12 0%
rCOiT ∗ ≥ 0 8 -0.059∗∗ 0.03 -0.026∗ 0.03 -0.033∗∗ 0.03 88%
rCOiT ∗ < 0 19 -0.059
∗∗
0.11 -0.026 0.11 -0.033 0.11 26%
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Table 6. Analysts’ recommendations for Mack-Cali (CLI)
This table displays various analysts’ assessment of the impact of the WTC attacks
on Mack-Cali (CLI) and their subsequent recommendations, from Investext. We collect
analysts’ reports issued immediately prior to the attack, issued 10 days subsequent to the
attack (highlighted), and published one to three quarters after the event.
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Figure 1. Price changes for oﬃce REITs
These figures plot the price change for each of the REITs in our sample, from the close
on Monday September 10, 2001 to the open on Monday September 17, 2001, with respect
to their corresponding amount of oﬃce space in the NY metro area (excluding downtown
Manhattan), measured in square feet (000s, Figure 1a) and in percentage of total square
footage (Figure 1b).
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Figure 2. Insider trading: NY REITs versus NO NY REITs
This figure displays the cumulative sums of the ratios BUYt−SELLt
BUYt+SELLt
, where BUYt
and SELLt are the total number of shares bought and sold, respectively, by insiders in
month t, between January 2001 and March 2002, for the REITs in our sample with some
exposure to the NY metro area excluding downtown Manhattan (NY, solid line) and for
the REITs with no such exposure (NO NY, dashed line), described in Table 1. The data
are obtained from WRDS (Wharton Research Data Services) TFN Insider Filing Data
Files, which contain all insider activity as reported on SEC forms 3, 4, 5, and 144.
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Figure 3. Cumulative abnormal returns for NY REITs
This figure plots cumulative abnormal returns (CARs, solid line) for the 12 REITs with
some exposure to the NY metro oﬃce market excluding downtown Manhattan (NY) over
the interval 09/17/2001 - 06/17/2002. The CAR series are generated by first estimating
the following market model for close-to-close daily REIT returns (rCCit ):
rCCit − rFt = αi + βi (rMt − rFt) + εit, (1)
where rFt is the three-month Treasury Bill rate and rMt is the daily return on the Morgan
Stanley REIT Index (MSREIT), over the interval 01/02/1998 - 09/10/2001 (as reported
in Table 4), then computing abnormal returns (ARs) from Eq. (1) as the diﬀerence
rCCit −brCCit for each of the REITs in the two subsamples, and finally cumulating ARs over
time and aggregating them across REITs. We also show 95% confidence intervals (dashed
lines) under the null hypothesis of zero CARs.
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